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Introduction
The diaspora is a long-term feature of New Zealand’s 
migration system and its political landscape. Yet the New 
Zealand government does not have a coherent approach 
towards it. Why not? It cannot be because nothing 
important is happening: around 850 New Zealanders 
emigrate in the average week, and around one in five 
New Zealanders now lives abroad. Moreover, while 
not a first-order policy issue in itself, this is important 
across a range of policy areas, and occasionally requires 
urgent government attention. A more likely explanation 
for the absence of coherence is that New Zealand still 
sees itself as a migrant-receiving country, and that the 
diaspora has been a political hot potato, making level-
headed debate difficult. 
With some heat temporarily dissipated from the issue, 
it seems an appropriate time to consider long-term 
scenarios. This article suggests that the diaspora is a 
long-term social, political and economic reality for 
New Zealand, and that it therefore deserves a more 
coherent, holistic and long-term approach from the 
New Zealand Government. Moreover, it suggests that 
good state-diaspora relations can mitigate some of the 
political and economic costs of sustained emigration. 
With this in mind, the article presents three scenarios 
to illustrate what kinds of relationship the New Zealand 
Government could have with the diaspora. It is hoped 
that these scenarios might contribute to more strategic 
thinking in this area.
A New Zealand ‘diaspora’? 
In the average year since 1979, 43,976 New Zealand 
citizens have departed the country, while only 23,398 
have arrived (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). As a result, 
a comparatively large proportion of New Zealanders live 
abroad. Verifiable bare-minimum estimates (known to 
be undercounts1) put the number of New Zealanders 
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abroad at between 459,322 (Bryant & Law, 2004) and 
528,597 (Migration DRC, 2007). Scholars guesstimate 
between 600,000 and 850,000 (Bedford, 2001; Hugo, 
Rudd & Harris, 2003). Estimates of 1 million or more 
regularly appear in the media (Dusevic, 2006; see 
also www.nzedge.com/intro/). The number of New 
Zealanders abroad has never been accurately counted 
and remains unknown.
The key question is, do these people still actively identify 
themselves as New Zealanders, despite lengthy dispersion? 
In other words, are they a ‘diaspora’2 (Butler, 2001)? 
New data collected in early 2006 by the government-
supported Kiwi Expatriate Association (Kea) sheds some 
new light on this question. Eighteen thousand people 
completed Kea’s ‘Every One Counts’ questionnaire, 
which was directed at ‘Kiwi expatriates’ and distributed 
by a chain email. This method ensured that the sample 
was self-selective of people who identified as New 
Zealanders and were actively connected enough to receive 
the survey through their email networks. Respondents’ 
most common transnational activities were social, such 
as staying in touch with family and friends in New 
Zealand. Transnational activities of a more civic nature 
were also fairly common – things like reading newspapers 
and websites, belonging to New Zealand organisations, 
and keeping in contact through government sources. 
Transnational economic activities were relatively 
uncommon, although many respondents held bank 
accounts or other securities in New Zealand. 
The Kea respondents were certainly well dispersed: 
though concentrated in three main locations – the UK 
1 For discussion of problems counting expatriates, see dumont and 
lemaître (2004) and Hugo (2006a).
2	 	Butler	(2001)	identifies	four	defining	features	of	diaspora	on	which	
most theorists agree: dispersion across one or more locations, 
self-identification	with	 a	 common	group	 identity,	maintenance	of	
a relationship to a homeland, and persistence over two or more 
generations.
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and Ireland (48.9%), the USA (11.6%) and Australia 
(26.3%) – they were spread across more than 150 
countries. Many had been away for long periods, and 
wrote detailed comments on their identity. In some 
cases they eulogised national symbols, such as the All 
Blacks, the country’s ‘nuclear free’ stance and its natural 
beauty. In other cases they expressed loyalty mixed with 
frustration, condemning things like the tax system and 
infrastructure, political correctness, and a range of other 
ways in which people felt New Zealand had ruined a 
perfectly good country.
Their ambivalence highlights an important question: 
does or will New Zealand identity persist beyond 
the first generation of emigrants? The survey 
methodology was inconclusive, but only around 5% 
of Kea respondents were New Zealanders by descent 
(as opposed to birth or ‘naturalisation’). Whether this 
ambiguity disqualifies use of the word ‘diaspora’ in the 
New Zealand case depends largely on one’s theoretical 
persuasions. Theorists are split on the question of 
whether persistence across generations is a defining 
characteristic of diasporas, with ‘classical’ theorists of 
the Jewish case arguing that it is, and contemporary 
theorists of transnationalism and globalisation not 
insisting on this point (for further discussion see Butler, 
2001; Hugo, 2006a; Reis, 2004). 
Notwithstanding theoretical quibbles, the Kea data shows 
that there is a New Zealand diaspora numbering at least 
18,000 people – and it seems likely that they are selective of 
a much larger ‘transnational New Zealand’ population.
Why does the diaspora matter? 
The New Zealand diaspora is unlikely to become a ‘first-
order’ policy issue. However, it deserves higher priority 
attention than it currently receives, and this attention 
could be more coherent, holistic and long-term. As a 
benchmark, it is worth noting that the Australian diaspora 
is proportionally smaller than the New Zealand diaspora,3 
yet the Australian case has been characterised by a more 
sophisticated debate involving examination of more 
options (Australian Senate, 2005; Betts, 2006; Carli, 2006; 
Fedi, 2006; Fullilove & Flutter, 2004; Hugo, 2005, 2006a, 
2006b; Hugo et al., 2003; see also www.southern-cross-
group.org). Nor is Australia alone amongst developed 
nations in treating the issue seriously (see, for example, 
Cowen, 2002; Sriskandarajah & Drew, 2006).
Australian demographer Graeme Hugo (Hugo, 2006a) 
has outlined a number of reasons why the Australian 
‘diaspora’ matters. The first relates to national identity, 
also a strategic priority for the New Zealand government. 
Taking into account migrants and their relationships 
with both origin and receiving states, social scientists 
in general are increasingly being forced to think outside 
the square of the nation state when they theorise society, 
using the so-called ‘transnational lens’ to analyse social 
dynamics that span national borders (Basch, Schiller & 
Szanton Blanc, 1994). As Hugo puts it, the country’s 
geographical borders do not necessarily delimit its 
national population (Hugo, 2006b).
This point cuts deep into New Zealand’s relatively ‘new 
and fractured’ (Spoonley, Bedford & Mcpherson, 2003) 
national identity. Consider, for example, that being 
Mäori abroad involves a different formal relationship 
with ‘home’ than being a New Zealander abroad. New 
Zealand citizenship is ‘earned’ through a mixture of 
ancestral, birth and residence criteria, whereas formal 
membership in Mäori society is inherited through 
whakapapa (genealogy).4 Some groups might argue that 
current national identity legislation neither reflects nor 
affects who is and who is not Mäori, and that all Mäori 
in diaspora should be able to return to Aotearoa, their 
turangawaewae (home ground), even if they are not 
New Zealand citizens. Without necessarily advocating 
this view, one can discern both legal and normative 
arguments which might sustain it. 
A legal argument for non-citizen Mäori return could 
begin from articles two and three of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Article the second ‘guarantees to the Chiefs 
and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective 
families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates 
Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may 
collectively or individually possess so long as it is their 
wish and desire to retain the same in their possession’. 
This clause might be interpreted as a guarantee that 
3  Census estimates suggest that the Australian diaspora constitutes 
less than 5% of the Australian-born, while expatriates are around 
15% of all New Zealand-born; around 25% of New Zealand’s skilled 
workforce resides abroad. while not unusually large in comparison 
to	the	diasporas	of	the	Pacific	Island	micro-states,	which	send	many	
migrants to New Zealand, New Zealand’s own diaspora is the second 
largest in the OECd after Ireland’s. 
4	 Proving	some	Maori	ancestry	is	a	necessary	and	sufficient	condition	
for being recognised as Maori. 
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Mäori customs of kin-based membership and property 
rights will be protected in perpetuity by the state. 
Article the third of the Treaty grants Mäori ‘all the 
Rights and Privileges of British Subjects’ (emphasis 
added), as opposed to the rights and privileges of 
New Zealand citizens. In 1840 when the Treaty was 
signed, the rights of British subjects included the right 
to come and go from New Zealand at will, and the 
legal category of New Zealand citizen did not exist. 
The latter was formed in the mid-twentieth century 
through decisions by the British and New Zealand 
governments, and confers more restricted mobility 
rights. It might be argued that these decisions did not 
honour the agreements in the Treaty, were not preceded 
by adequate consultation with Mäori, and therefore do 
not legitimately limit the ability of non-citizen Mäori 
to reside on their lands. 
This technical argument is far from clear cut, but 
draws emotive strength from norms about post-
colonial reparative justice, which underpin broadly 
similar claims in New Zealand on a regular basis. A 
more explicit normative argument could begin from 
theories of multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995). 
For example, Kymlicka argues that there are normative 
reasons why the state should provide minorities with 
‘external protection’ from decisions made by the wider 
society which would otherwise restrict the liberty of 
minorities to maintain their cultural practices. Some 
people might argue that Mäori residence on tribal land 
is a cultural practice that should be – or should have 
been – protected from external decisions to alter national 
identity legislation. What is particularly unsettling 
about this line of argument is that many liberal 
multiculturalists have campaigned vociferously against 
ethnic citizenship criteria (in receiving states), but here 
is a liberal multicultural argument for ethnic citizenship 
(in sending states). Perhaps this paradox illustrates that 
it is just as excessive to completely separate ethnicity 
and citizenship as it is to equate them.
Through the special ministerial grant of citizenship, New 
Zealand identity legislation does provide a channel for 
recognising intergenerational ties (Identity Policy Team, 
2006a, 2006b). However, the ‘rights’ of non-citizen 
Mäori still raise important questions. Must national 
identity legislation apply consistently to all cultural 
groups in increasingly diverse societies? Are expatriate 
Mäori the only New Zealanders with significant 
intergenerational links to the country? Which models 
of belonging are appropriate for New Zealand: those 
that attach to territory, or those that attach to people? 
Is inherited national identity relevant in a globalising 
world? If so, should governments encourage citizenship 
by descent by emphasising the benefits of ‘staying Kiwi’? 
What exactly are these benefits if one lives abroad, and 
are they consistent across ethnic groups? Systematically 
and cooperatively thinking through such questions 
in the context of a focused debate on state–diaspora 
relations would seem to fit squarely within the current 
government’s strategic focus on national identity. 
For Hugo (2006a) the diaspora also matters because 
diasporas can and do play a significant role in economic 
and social development in their home countries (also 
see Levitt, 1998; Newland & Patrick, 2004; Van Hear, 
Pieke & Vertovec, 2004; Vertovec, 2004). New Zealand 
is probably no exception, though the evidence is patchy. 
For example, it is well known that the expatriate 
experience has played a vital role in the development of 
a distinctive New Zealand literary and artistic culture 
(Belich, 2001), though this has not been the subject of 
social science research. There is increasing recognition 
that for young New Zealanders the overseas experience 
is an expected element of career development (for 
example, see Carr, Inkson & Thorn, 2005), yet there are 
no studies of the impact of overseas experience on career 
achievement or local economic development in New 
Zealand. Anecdotally we know that the Kiwi OE – like 
most labour migration flows – is often a route to social 
mobility and home ownership at home. Yet, despite a 
national debate about the impacts of net migration on 
inflation and housing prices, there is no discussion of the 
housing-market impacts of returning New Zealanders, 
who form a major component of our migration inflows. 
Indeed, despite all that we know from the international 
literature about the economic impacts of emigration at 
source, no study of New Zealand expatriates’ financial 
transfers appears to exist. Various government strategies 
have emphasised how transnational engagement with 
expatriates provides opportunities for economic growth 
and transformation, and from other examples it is easy 
to see how this thinking has a basis in fact. In order 
for it to bear fruit, better qualitative and quantitative 
understanding is needed regarding the existing 
economic, political and sociocultural transnationalism 
of New Zealanders. 
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The diaspora matters to Hugo because it is becoming 
more self-aware and organised. As the Kea survey 
demonstrates, this is also happening in New Zealand – 
to the extent of it forming a loose lobby group through 
organisations such as Kea and the New Zealand Institute. 
If this trend of increasing coherence continues, successive 
governments will face not only increasing lobby pressure 
to form policies towards the diaspora, but also electoral 
pressure to seek constituencies within it – as has happened 
in many other countries with large diasporas. Overseas 
campaigning has already become an element of national 
elections in New Zealand. For example, the Labour Party 
increased their overseas vote by 40% in 2002 partly due 
to Australian-based trade unions campaigning on their 
behalf. A future increase in political participation amongst 
overseas voters could potentially transform New Zealand’s 
political landscape. 
However, emigration and the diaspora do not merely 
flash into existence at election time. This is a population 
that has accrued over many decades, is actively involved 
in the same social, economic and political fields as the 
New Zealand state, and will not disappear any time 
soon. Fewer than 23% of Kea survey respondents had 
definite return plans, while more than 50% didn’t 
know, probably wouldn’t return or definitely planned 
not to. Nor can the ‘moral panic’ over ‘brain drain’ 
which peaked in 2000 (Davenport, 2004) – and forced 
a reaction from the government – be considered an 
isolated event. The 2000 episode maintained a steady 
level of media prominence between 1999 and 2001, 
and, since the late 1980s, concerns about emigration 
(lumped under the heading of ‘brain drain’) have 
never been far below the surface (Bain, 1996; Button, 
1988; Chamberlain, 2004, 2005; Collins, 2002; Davis 
& Thomas, 2005; Deutsche Bank, 2003; Gamlen, 
2005; Jaspan & Colebatch, 2007; McCrone, 2007; 
McCurdy, 2004; New Zealand Herald, 2007). A mini 
brain drain debate flares up at peaks and troughs in net 
migration cycles, during debates over race relations, and 
at moments of economic downturn. In between times, 
emigration and diaspora are intimately bound up with 
angst over long-term strategic issues like New Zealand’s 
ageing population (Bedford, Ho & Hugo, 2003), fears 
of losing contact with children and grandchildren living 
abroad,5 and the taxation system. 
In short, while not a first-order priority, the diaspora is 
a long-term feature of both the migration system and 
the political landscape in New Zealand, and at specific 
points it is an issue of acute political importance. A 
deliberate approach to fostering and managing good 
relations with the diaspora could offset the economic 
costs of emigrants taking their business elsewhere, 
and the political costs from accusations of causing or 
allowing a ‘brain drain’. It would make sense if New 
Zealand’s long-term state planning reflected this. 
Tactics without strategy
However, the current approach to the New Zealand 
diaspora is one of tactics without strategy. The diaspora 
is affected by a collection of activities dispersed across 
government, some of which are old and all but forgotten, 
and others of which are new and prototypical. It is 
useful to separate these mechanisms into three simple 
categories, which are discussed below: extracting 
benefits, extending rights, and capacity building 
(Gamlen, 2006).6 
1. Extracting benefits 
Expatriates have always been called upon to contribute 
to New Zealand’s export development and promotion 
activities, which have developed over the past 30 years 
and are currently managed by New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise (NZTE). They have done so both formally 
(through mechanisms such as advisory boards) and 
informally (through access to in-market social and 
professional networks). 
New ideas about extracting benefits from expatriates 
came out of the government’s 2002 Growth and 
Innovation Framework strategy (GIF), which was 
developed in partnership with private sector stakeholders 
– including prominent expatriates (Office of the Prime 
Minister, 2002) – and aimed to raise per capita GDP 
performance. These ideas have precipitated two 
main initiatives, which have carried over into the 
current government’s strategic focus on economic 
transformation. The first is a drive to stimulate return 
migration. The Department of Labour’s (DoL) three-
year, approximately $3m Expatriates Programme was 
5 I am grateful to Paul Callister for suggesting this point.
6 These categories extend the predominant trend in scholarly literature 
on diaspora policies, which views them through the lens of national 
membership beyond the national territory. As their titles suggest, the 
following publications are indicative: Barry, 2006; Bauböck, 1994, 
2005; Betts, 2006; Fitzgerald, 2006; Goldring, 1998; Guarnizo, 1994; 
laguerre, 1999; lee, 2004; Smith, 2003a, 2003b).
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established in 2005 and focuses on keeping expatriates 
in touch with New Zealand, especially with a view to 
attracting them back. This workstream is aligned with 
two major fiscal incentives aimed at return and retention 
of ‘talent’. The first is a five-year tax holiday on foreign 
income sources for returning long-term expatriates in 
high income brackets, with administrative and operating 
costs of approximately $1.1m in year one and $330,000 
thereafter, and estimated annual fiscal costs of $10–13m. 
The second provides interest-free student loans for New 
Zealand residents at an annual cost of around $300m, 
and a ‘fresh start’ for overseas borrowers – including 
an amnesty on missed-repayment penalties – at an 
estimated net fiscal cost of $15m per annum. 
The second (much smaller) initiative focuses on 
keeping expatriates connected and contributing to 
New Zealand from afar. For the eight-year period from 
2002 to 2010, the government (mainly through the 
Ministry of Economic Development (MED)) has so 
far approved around $2.4m in infrastructure grants to 
the Kiwi Expatriate Association. Kea is a public-private 
sponsored network of ‘talented’ expatriates aiming 
to increase connections between New Zealanders in 
order to further New Zealand’s economic interests. Its 
infrastructure consists of an online database of around 
20,000 expatriates, along with smaller local chapters 
in key offshore regions, several of which employ a paid 
manager. Kea is aligned with two NZTE programmes: 
‘World Class New Zealand’ (WCNZ) and ‘Beachheads’. 
Founded in 2001, WCNZ was initially funded at 
$2.25m per annum. Its funding now reduced to $1.17m 
per annum, it comprises two distinct elements: a high-
profile annual awards ceremony to celebrate prominent 
expatriates and other high-flying New Zealanders (see 
‘Capacity building’, below), and a WCNZ network 
which links the ‘top tier’ of expatriates and ‘friends 
of New Zealand’ with a view to enhancing their 
engagement with and contribution to the country. 
WCNZ is jointly delivered with Kea, which has received 
around $1m for the contract since 2005 (in addition 
to the $2.4m in grants mentioned above). Beachheads 
is led by well-connected expatriates in offshore markets 
and aims to match high-potential New Zealand-based 
firms with mentoring from global business leaders (at 
an annual public cost of $1.2m ongoing). 
2. Extending rights
Four areas of government activity are relevant here. 
First is the right to vote, which New Zealand extends 
fairly expansively by international standards: both 
citizens and permanent residents can vote from 
abroad (for up to three years and one year after last 
departure, respectively). Second is the right to consular 
protection, which contrasts widely by consular post 
– from minimum services specified in the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (United Nations, 
1963) (such as in Sydney), to a much broader range 
of activities including outreach into expatriate 
communities (such as in London). Third are social 
rights, which New Zealand extends through a number 
of bilateral agreements on social security and pension 
transferability (though these are primarily negotiated 
to achieve fiscal net savings rather than in the interests 
of expatriates’ rights as such). 
Finally, two emerging discussions are relevant to external 
citizenship rights: one surrounds the intersection of 
population ageing and the needs of transnationally 
scattered families (for example, see Lunt, McPherson 
& Browning, 2006), and the other surrounds the 
development needs of Mäori in Australia (Hamer, 
2007). Such discussions have run parallel to one of 
the government’s strategic themes (Families – Young 
and Old), but have not made a substantial impact on 
mainstream policy discussions; they take place against 
a background of emphasising celebration of ‘talent’ and 
counteracting the tall poppy syndrome, which tend to 
create the impression that all expatriates are successful 
(though actually there are also pockets of vulnerability 
that New Zealand ‘owns’ at least as much as it owns the 
‘World Class New Zealanders’). Nevertheless, as one 
senior analyst in the Ministry of Social Development put 
it (speaking unofficially), policy questions surrounding 
the diaspora revolve around the question, ‘What can the 
expatriates do for us?’ 
3. Capacity building
This term refers to activities that promote national 
identity among emigrants, and to efforts at building 
state institutions dedicated to this population. Identity-
fostering activities include the offshore national events 
and celebrations supported to varying degrees by 
diplomatic and consular postings; the awards components 
of the World Class New Zealand programme mentioned 
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above; and, at a more fundamental level, work on 
citizenship by descent within the Department of Internal 
Affairs (Identity Policy Team, 2006a, 2006b). The only 
two institution-building activities of note are DoL’s 
time-limited expatriates programme and Kea (which is 
quasi-non-governmental), and there was been limited 
coherence between the two. Beyond these, activities that 
affect expatriates are fragmented and dispersed across 
government – having come into being at different times, 
for different reasons, in different locations within the 
state system – and there is no agency with responsibility 
for coherence among them.
In sum, although New Zealand has a relatively large 
number of programmes and activities that have an 
impact on the diaspora, these are dispersed widely across 
government. Prominent ideas regarding expatriates have 
been voiced in strategic plans about growth, innovation 
and economic transformation, but only small initiatives 
with relatively little coherence have fallen out of this 
rhetoric. How can this situation be explained? One 
plausible account is that it reflects the politicised nature 
of debate over emigration and expatriates: long-term 
brain drain fears, which peaked in 1999–2001, have 
forced government to respond to accusations of causing 
or allowing a brain drain, despite a lack of consensus 
about the exact nature of the ‘problem’, and what to do 
about it. Established tools to react have been noticeably 
absent, because New Zealand still sees itself essentially 
as a migrant-receiving country.
Envisioning state–diaspora relations
However, New Zealand is now also a substantial 
migrant-sending country, and this is unlikely to 
change any time soon. State–emigrant relations are an 
important channel through which migrant-sending 
states keep emigrants engaged in national development 
and block political accusations of causing/allowing brain 
drain. What kinds of long-term relationship could the 
New Zealand state have with its emigrants? To help 
stimulate thinking and discussion in this area, this article 
outlines three hypothetical scenarios regarding New 
Zealand’s state–diaspora relations, based on the work 
of Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller (Levitt & Glick 
Schiller, 2004). Each scenario involves both threats 
and opportunities – these are not intended as policy 
options but rather as schemata within which different 
approaches and outcomes might be conceptualised.
In any of these scenarios, the diaspora is a source of 
pressures on political actors in the sending state. On 
one hand are economic pressures, motivating the 
government to economically incorporate expatriates 
as a way of boosting growth, and social pressures to 
redistribute wealth ‘fairly’ among members of the 
nation, motivating the government to extend rights 
to the diaspora. These two pressures tend to reinforce 
each other: attempts to extract economic benefits on the 
basis of shared identity generate demands for ‘fairness’ 
on the same grounds, and vice versa. On the other 
hand there are political pressures on the government 
– from both domestic and international sources – to 
limit governmental activity to the national territory. 
These take the form of accusations of interference from 
receiving states, and complaints from domestic actors 
against governments that seem to ‘over-serve’ emigrants. 
Thus, economic and social pressures are centrifugal, 
tending to stimulate engagement with the diaspora, 
while political pressures are centripetal, tending to 
constrain engagement. 
In the first scenario, New Zealand is a transnational 
nation state, which treats its emigrants as long-term, 
long-distance members with undiminished rights and 
responsibilities attached to national belonging. In this 
scenario, the diaspora is integrated deeply into New 
Zealand’s formal economic, political and sociocultural 
fields. New Zealand depends on the economic and 
political contributions of its diaspora and the state 
cultivates it attentively. New Zealanders abroad are hard-
wired into national governance processes, and consular 
officials are held somewhat responsible for protecting 
and representing them – though they also monitor 
and attempt to manipulate diaspora communities. The 
government cautiously avoids accusations of interference 
from host states and complaints from domestic 
electorates about over-serving emigrants. 
In the second scenario, New Zealand is a strategically 
selective state, which encourages some form of long-
distance economic and political nationalism but tries 
to selectively and strategically manage what emigrants 
can and cannot do. Recognising both the political 
and economic influence that emigrants wield, and the 
fact that many are unlikely to return, New Zealand’s 
public institutions take steps to encourage emigrants 
to remain involved at home. However, the government 
exerts some control over their ties, trying to prevent 
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the interests of emigrants from conflicting with those 
of the state. It switches between courting and milking 
elements of the diaspora, whichever is currently the 
most politically and economically expedient tactic. 
The transaction costs of frequently changing tack 
are significant: there are short-term opportunities for 
freeloaders to pose as representatives, and some more 
legitimate representatives are alienated by what they see 
as an exploitative attitude. 
In the third scenario, New Zealand is a disinterested and 
denouncing state, which treats emigrants as if they no 
longer belong to their homeland. Some sections of the 
diaspora are deeply dissident: they see New Zealand’s 
public institutions as illegitimate and act as a vocal 
opposition to the state, using their external positioning 
to foment internal conflicts and create international 
pressures to overturn and replace the New Zealand 
state. Overtures by New Zealanders abroad are viewed 
as suspect because migrants are seen as having turned 
their back on the homeland, or even as traitors to its 
cause. Emigration is the target of punitive policies, and 
it is made difficult for returnees to reintegrate. 
These are not options, but scenarios, and each is 
contingent on more than state actions alone. This paper 
highlights only two broad options: either New Zealand 
can actively steer a course through these scenarios, or 
it can passively react to the increasingly transnational 
nature of its society. The latter approach seems to have 
avoided dispute recently, for two probable reasons. 
Firstly, ‘replacement’ migration has generated net 
population inflows, thus both masking emigration itself 
and allaying the associated economic fears by helping 
to sustain economic growth. Secondly, a sprinkling of 
(mostly cosmetic) programmes has had some success 
at deflecting the political heat on the government: the 
abolition of interest on student loans somewhat rebuts 
the charge that government is causing emigration, while 
the contrasting programmes in DoL and MED pacify 
different groups who demand different responses to 
emigration. However, this default approach seems a 
short-term game – one that may, in the long term, lead 
to an undesirable scenario.
Conclusion 
While not a first-order policy issue in itself, the diaspora 
is a long-term feature of New Zealand’s migration system 
and political landscape. There is little evidence to suggest 
that an economic turnaround, a worsening of the global 
instabilities precipitated by 9/11, or even a contraction 
of global transport infrastructure in response to climate 
change and ‘peak oil’ would dramatically reduce the size 
of the diaspora or the significance of emigration within 
New Zealand’s migration system. It is similarly unlikely 
that long-term brain drain fears are gone forever. The 
current economic upswing will end someday. ‘Replacing’ 
New Zealand citizen departures with new immigrants 
will continue to generate debates over transaction costs 
and social cohesion – and the next cyclical economic 
downturn will exacerbate the ugly xenophobic tone of 
these debates once again. New Zealand’s brain drain 
debate will buzz into life again (when the theory comes 
back into vogue internationally, at least), and the current 
New Zealand government’s somewhat half-hearted 
swatting tactics may not be sufficient to nail the sceptics 
next time round. 
A coherent, holistic and long-term approach could 
help the state to reduce the downside of emigration 
and the diaspora – the recurrent political exposure to 
the charge of causing or allowing brain drain, and the 
costs incurred as a proportion of emigrants simply drift 
away and disengage with New Zealand permanently. 
Moreover, such an approach also has an open upside, 
when one looks at the successes of countries such as 
Israel, Ireland, India and China in ‘leveraging’ their 
diasporas. The first requirement of such an approach 
is to acknowledge that New Zealand’s population is 
transnational, and to conceptualise the role of the 
state within it. This article has outlined some broad 
scenarios to contribute to a process of envisioning 
state–diaspora relations. Moreover, it suggests that now 
may be a sensible time to develop a coherent approach 
to state–diaspora relations: with economic growth 
currently reaching a peak and brain drain fears at a low 
point, there is some thinking space for decision makers 
to consider long-term strategies, instead of reacting to 
immediate political attacks or economic crises. This 
window of opportunity seems narrow, with economic 
storms on the horizon coming into an election year. In 
short, emigration management is a long game, and right 
now there is time to make hay while the sun shines.
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